











On the Rationality of Political Actors
李　　利範*
Lee Rhee Beom
I examine the place of rationality of actors in political choice actions. Rational choice theo-
lists have presumed that actors behave according to utility maximization or satisfaction maxi-
mization models: These assumptions are based mainly on an individual, selfish, and autono-
mous choice. Empirical studies have proved that selfishless or altruistic motivations of actors,
as well as selfish ones, play major roles in individual political actions. Further, the rationality
of political actors is limited in three aspects. The first limit is the lack of appropriate infor-
mation and actor's computating ability. The second is in the interactions between actors and
their environmental factors, especially norms and institutions. And the third is in the re-
straints in actor's cognitive mechanism. Therefore, descriptions of the rationality in political
choice actions should begin with an explanation of the processes of these interactions and the
actor's cognitive mechanism.







































1 ) Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical
Politics, 1989, pp. 131-48.
2 ) Jon Elster, "When Rationality Fails," In The Limits of Rationality, pp. 19-47, edited by Karen Schweers Cook and Mar-









































































4 ) Cf., Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
5 ) Cf., Geoffrey Brennan, "Comment: What Might Rationality Fail to Do?," In The Limits of Rationality, pp. 51-9, edited
by Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
6 ) Cf., Catherin H. Zuckert, "On the 'Rationality'of Rational Choice," Political Psychology, 1995, pp. 179-98.
7)その分け方と基準は、論者の研究目的や方法論によって異なるはずであり、合理性自体を整理した文献はあまり見当た
らなかったので、若干無理な分け方となってしまったかもしれない。
8 ) Cf., Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Self-interest means less outside of a Social Context: Cultural Contributions to a Theory of
Rational Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994, pp. 131-59.
1998年3月　　　　　　　　　　政治的アクターの合理性について　　　　　　　　　　　　　173
(1)効用最大化モデル　　　　　　　　　　セットをCl、 C2、 C3とすると、 Rは3つの結
1950年代後半政治的アクター、投票者の投　　巣の間の関係を指す　CIR-C3は、 Clは少なく
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成されると主張する87)。つまり、アクターは　　認める点である。この相互関係をどのように
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